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The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs
Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury 
Abstract
This paper explores whether reemployment bonuses-cash payments made to insured 
unemployed workers who find reemployment quickly-have the unintended consequence of 
displacing workers who are not covered by the bonus program. We develop two partial 
equilibrium matching models of the labor market, patterned after the work of Diamond (1982), 
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1984). In the first model, wages are assumed exogenous, in 
the second endogenous. In both, we find that the direct substitution of covered for uncovered 
workers (which constitutes displacement) is countered by two offsetting effects: a gross job 
creation effect, which results from thee increased search effort of covered workers; and a 
relatively small rivalry effect, in which uncovered workers search harder because of the increased 
difficulty they face in finding jobs. Both models suggest that, on net, the displacement effect is 
small to nonexistent.
The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs
Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper No. 90-02
The reemployment bonus is a cash payment made to an Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
recipient who finds a job within a relatively short period after filing for UI benefits. Two 
randomized trials of the reemployment bonus have already been completed, one in Illinois 
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987), the other in New Jersey (Mathematica Policy Research 1989), 
and both have suggested that a reemployment bonus program could substantially reduce the 
duration of insured unemployment without adverse consequences for workers covered by the 
bonus program. 1 Additional, more refined, experiments with the reemployment x bonus are 
currently in progress in Washington State and Pennsylvania.
Nevertheless, an important concern surrounding the reemployment bonus is that it could 
reduce the number of steady-state jobs held by workers who are not covered by the program. To 
take the extreme case, if each new job obtained by a covered worker were at the expense of an 
uncovered worker, then the program's effect would simply be distributional and there would be 
no real effect on total unemployment. This "displacement effect," if large, would greatly 
decrease the attractiveness of the reemployment bonus.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple partial equilibrium matching model of the 
labor market that allows us to investigate the nature and size of the displacement effect. We 
accomplish this by assuming that it takes time and effort for unemployed workers and firms with 
vacancies to find each other. Workers can increase the probability of finding employment by 
increasing their search effort, but increased search effort is costly. In equilibrium, workers 
choose a level of search activity that equates the expected gain from additional search with 
marginal cost. The bonus program increases the expected payoff to search for covered workers 
and therefore results in an increase in their search effort. This increase in search activity has 
three effects. First, if we hold search effort by uncovered workers constant, then there will be 
an immediate increase in the number of jobs held by covered workers. Some of these new jobs 
may come at the expense of uncovered workers but others will simply be due to the fact that 
greater search activity allows the economy to make better use of the existing search technology 
and therefore operate closer to full employment. The new jobs created will eventually benefit 
uncovered workers as well since when the worker needs to be replaced, both covered and 
uncovered workers will be free to compete for the job opening. We refer to the increase in 
overall employment due to the change in the covered workers' search effort as the "gross job 
creation effect" of the bonus program. The fact that some of the increase in covered employment 
comes at the expense of uncovered workers is referred to as the "direct substitution effect."
'Throughout the paper, we refer to workers who are eligible to receive a bonus and are attempting to make use 
of that eligibility as "covered." Workers who are inelgible for the bonus because they are ineligible for UI, because they 
fail to find a job within the bonus qualification period, or because they chose not to participate in the program are referred 
to as "uncovered."
The third effect of the bonus program is generated by the change in the search behavior 
of uncovered workers. Since the increased search effort of covered workers will make it more 
difficult for uncovered workers to find employment, the bonus program will trigger an increase 
in search effort of uncovered workers as well. This "rivalry effect" will increase the number of 
jobs held by uncovered workers and will tend to neutralize the direct substitution effect. The 
result is increased employment for both covered and uncovered workers. Moreover, even in 
cases in which the direct substitution effect dominates, we find that the displacement effect is 
relatively small.
The paper divides into three additional sections. In the first section we introduce a simple 
version of a partial equilibrium matching model that is patterned after the work of Diamond 
(1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984). This model incorporates the elements of the 
Illinois reemployment bonus experiment, which offered a $500 cash bonus to insured workers 
who were reemployed within 11 weeks of filing for UI. In this simple version of the model, 
wages are assumed to be exogenous and unaffected by the program (this is consistent with 
empirical evidence gathered during the Illinois experiment). Data gathered in the course of 
evaluating the experiment are then used to infer values for the unobservable parameters of the 
model. Finally, estimates of the displacement effect are obtained by solving the model assuming 
that the program is in effect. In the second section, the model is extended to allow wages to be 
determined endogenously. We demonstrate that although this complicates the analysis 
considerably, it does not affect that qualitative nature of our results. That is, we show that the 
result that the displacement effect is small (or non-existent) is robust. In the final section, we 
begin by summarizing our results. We then go on to argue that while our model is rich enough 
to capture many of the essential features of frictional unemployment, it is also simple enough to 
be used to study the displacement effects of a variety of government programs. The analysis 
provided in this paper serves as an example of its potential value.
I. The Displacement Effect with Fixed Wages 
A. The model
To investigate the nature of the displacement effect we need a model with the following 
characteristics: (a) there must be two classes of workers-those covered by the bonus program and 
those uncovered; (b) there must be an equilibrium level of unemployment; and (c) each 
unemployed worker should choose search effort to maximize expected income. In the model 
developed in this section, the set of covered workers consists of all jobless workers who have 
been unemployed for fewer than twelve weeks (as in the Illinois experiment). No other jobless 
worker is eligible for the bonus. To capture (b) it is necessary to assume that jobs do not last 
forever. That is, in each period some jobs dissolve (creating unemployment) and new ones form. 
In equilibrium, the rate of job creation and job dissolution are equal. To capture (c) we assume 
that it takes time and effort for firms with vacancies and unemployed workers to find each other
(thus, unemployment is frictional). Jobless workers can reduce the time it takes to find 
employment by searching more intensely, although increasing one's search effort is costly.
The fact that we employ an equilibrium model of the labor market distinguishes our work 
from other studies of the Illinois experiment. For example, Mortensen (1987) and Levine (1989) 
each use a search-model of labor supply to investigate the impact of the bonus program on the 
search behavior of covered workers. Their models do not consider labor demand (in that the 
distribution of wage offers is exogenous and does not change once the program is implemented) 
or allow analysis of how changes in the behavior of covered workers affect the behavior and 
welfare of uncovered workers. Our equilibrium model allows us to determine the direct impact 
of the program (through its effect on covered workers' search behavior) as well as its indirect 
effect (through its effect on equilibrium unemployment and the search behavior of uncovered 
workers). This is especially true of our model in section II where wages are treated as 
endogenous variables.
The model is explained in two stages. First, we discuss the steady-state conditions and 
the search technology. These conditions describe the dynamics of the labor market including the 
manner in which jobs are created and destroyed. In addition, these conditions guarantee that the 
flows into and out of employment are equal (so that we have an equilibrium). Second, we solve 
the problem of a typical unemployed worker who must choose search effort to maximize expected 
lifetime income. To do so, we must first derive the expected income of workers who are 
employed and the expected income for unemployed workers. Search effort is then chosen to 
maximize the expected lifetime income of unemployed workers.
1. Steady State Conditions. Let J denote the steady state number of jobs held in the 
economy and V, the number of vacancies. Then, by definition, F denotes full employment where
(1) F = J + V.
We also interpret F as the number of firms in the economy. This is equivalent to an assumption 
that each firm employs at most one worker (i.e., there is no distinction between a firm and a 
vacancy). This modeling abstraction is used to keep the analysis as simple as possible. 2
Next, let L denote the total number of workers in the labor force (employed and 
unemployed); Ut , the number of unemployed workers who are in the tth week of search where 
t<ll; and Un , the number of workers who have been unemployed for more than gleven weeks. 
Then the number of workers covered by the program at any point in time is S Ut while Un
2Equivalency, we could assume that each firm consists of several job opportunities but recruits and fills each 
job separately.
represents the number of uncovered workers. 3 Since all workers are either employed or 
unemployed, it follows that
(2) L-J+2U..U • J ' U
f ft
t-l
where U is defined as total unemployment.
Equations (1) and (2) are simple accounting identities. We now turn to a description of 
the evolution of the labor market overtime. There are thirteen employment states: (employment 
(i.e., state J), covered unemployment (i.e., one state each for Ut with t^ll), and uncovered 
unemployment (i.e., state Un). Movements into and out of these states depend on the rates at 
which jobs are found and destroyed. Let mt denote the probability that a jobless covered worker 
in the t* period of search finds employment and let n^ play the same role for uncovered workers. 
Note that mt and mn are conditional reemployment probabilities - or conditional probabilities of 
creating a job match - often referred to as hazard rates. We use s to denote the separation (or 
"break-up") rate. That is, s represents the probability that a job will dissolve at any point in time. 
The determination of mt , mn , and s will be s discussed in detail below, but for now they will be 
treated as parameters.
The evolution of the labor market is depicted in Figure 1. Consider first the flows into 
each state of unemployment. In any given period there are J employed workers. At the end of 
the period sj of these workers lose their jobs and must reenter the search process. The 
remainder, (l-s)J, retain their jobs and remain in state J. Thus, the flow into state Uj is sj. 
Workers enter state Ut (with t< 11) if and only if they were in their (t-l) st period of search in the 
previous period and failed to find a job. Thus, the flow into state Ut is (l-m^U^. Finally, 
workers previously covered by the program lose their eligibility if they fail to find employment 
in their eleventh week of search. The flow into Un is therefore equal to (l-m^L^.
The flows out of each state are even easier to characterize. In each period, successful 
searchers in state Ut find employment and enter state J while unsuccessful ones move on to state 
Ut+1 . Thus, all jobless covered workers flow out of their current state. This implies that the flow 
out of Ut is simply Ut . Jobless uncovered workers leave their state only when they find 
employment. Thus the flow out of Un is equal to mnlln .
In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each employment state must be 
equal so that the unemployment rate and the composition of the unemployment pool do not vary 
over time. Equating these flows yields the following steady-state conditions4
3In this section, uncovered workers are those workers who failed to find reemployment sufficiently fast. Of 
course, there are some workers who are never covered by the program. We analyze the impact of the bonus program 
on this second type of "uncovered worker" in section II of the paper.
4We assume throughout that the separation rate (s) is not affected by the program so that it may be treated as 
exogenous.
(3) sj = Ui
(4) (l-m^Un = Ut fort=2, .... 11
(5) (l-m^Un = mnUn .
If (3)-(5) hold then J, Ut , and Un will not vary over time.
2. The Search Technology. The conditional reemployment (or matching) probabilities, 
mt and mn , depend on the nature of the search process and the level of search effort expended by 
unemployed workers. In each period, jobless workers choose their level of search effort to 
maximize expected lifetime income. This search effort determines the probability that the worker 
contacts a firm and applies for a job (search effort may be fruitless). The firms hires the worker 
at a wage of w if it has a vacancy and if no other applications are filed. If more than one worker 
applies, the firm chooses randomly among all applicants. A worker's reemployment probability 
therefore depends on the probability of contacting a firm, the probability that the contacted firm 
has a vacancy, and the probability of getting the job over all other applicants.
Formally, let pt denote the probability that, in any given period, a covered worker who 
has been unemployed for t weeks contacts a firm (pn plays the same role for uncovered workers). 5 
This contact probability can be interpreted as search effort since it can be increased only by 
searching more intensely. The determination of pt is discussed in the next subsection; for now, 
we treat it as a parameter. Once a firm has been contacted, the probability that this randomly 
chosen firm has a vacancy is  . Finally, if the firm does have a vacancy, the probability of 
receiving a job offer is  where N denotes the number of other applications filed. Since each 
other worker either does or does not apply at the firm in question (i.e., there are only two 
possibilities), N is a random variable distributed according to a Poisson distribution with 
parameter A, defined as the average number of applications filed at each firm. Thus, the 
probability that the worker gets the job, conditional on having applied at a firm with a vacancy 
is
5If p, < 1 then p, represents a contact probability. If pt > 1 then we interpret Pt as the number of firms contacted 
by the worker per period. For example, if ft= 1.5 then we assume that the worker contacts one firm with probability 1 
and a second firm with probability .5. We ignore the possibility that any given worker may contact the same firm twice 
in any given period.
The product of these three probabilities yields the conditional reemployment probability for each 
worker6
(6) w ^^[i.e-*] fort=l, .... 11
A r
with
Note that equation (8) provides the mechanism for displacement in the model. As the search 
effort of covered workers (pt) increases in response to the bonus, the number of contacts per firm 
(the term in brackets in equation 8) increases. Hence, the probability of receiving a job offer 
from a contacted firm with a vacancy falls.
3. Search Effort. Search effort is chosen to maximize expected lifetime income. It 
is clear from (6) and (7) that by searching harder an unemployed worker can increase the 
probability of reemployment. Of course, there is a cost associated with increased search effort. 
The optimal search effort results from equating the expected marginal benefit from an increase 
in search effort with its marginal cost.
To be precise, let Vt denote the expected lifetime income for an unemployed covered 
worker currently in the t* week of search (Vn plays the same role for an uncovered worker) . In 
addition, let Ve represent the expected lifetime income for a worker who is currently employed. 
Then, if we assume that search costs are quadratic, 7 Vt , Vn , and Ve satisfy
6This is equivalent to assuming that all job contacts are made by workers and that the underlying search 
technology is quadratic (see Diamond and Maskin, 1979 for details).
7The assumption that the marginal cost of search increases with effort is consistent with the empirical finding 
that the net return to search is decreasing in effort (see, for example, Barren and Gilley, 1981 or Chirinko, 1982). For 
the importance of this assumption, see Seater (1979).
Vt   x-cp2 * J- {m, (V. * ft) * (1- m,) VM } 
* 1 + r
(10)
(ID V . r- 2 1
where x denotes the weekly unemployment insurance benefit, b represents the bonus paid to 
covered workers when they find a job, and r is the weekly interest rate. Equation (9) states that 
a covered unemployed worker currently collects unemployment insurance benefits (x) and pays 
out search costs (cpj^). With probability mt search is successful and the worker collects a bonus 
of b and begins working (so that expected lifetime income increases to Ve). With probability (1- 
mt) search is unsuccessful and the worker continues to search in the next period (so that expected 
lifetime income becomes Vt+ j). These last two terms are discounted since they reflect income 
collected in the next week. Equation (10) is the analogous condition for a covered worker about 
to lose eligibility for a bonus and (11) is the appropriate expression for an uncovered worker. 
Note that when an uncovered worker finds a job no bonus is collected. Finally, (12) describes 
the situation faced by an employed worker. Current income is w but, with probability s the 
worker becomes unemployed and must begin searching for a new job (so that expected income 
drops to Vj). With probability (1-s) the worker remains employed and continues to earn Ve .
Each unemployed worker chooses pt . the contact probability, to maximize expected 
lifetime income. Therefore, pt can be interpreted as search effort. Applying Bellman's Principle 
of Optimally an maximizing each expression yields the following optimal levels of search effort 
(the reader is reminded that the m's are functions of the p's through (6) and (7)) 8
(12) V.' w +-
fort=l,..,10
8In maximizing Vt over p, we treat A as a parameter. The rationale for this is that since each worker is small 
relative to the market, each individual can ignore his/her own effect onA.
P . -L-rv -V] 
  LK< J
To summarize, in each period unemployed workers choose search effort (as measured by pt , the 
contact probability) to maximize expected lifetime income. The optimal values for search 
intensity are given by (13)-(15). These contact probabilities then determine the average number 
of applications filed at each firm (A as given in (8)) and the conditional reemployment 
probabilities (as given in (6) and (7)). Jobs are created as unemployed workers find firms with 
vacancies and production takes place. Finally, at the end of the period, a fraction s of all jobs 
break-up and the newly unemployed workers start searching for new jobs. The steady-state 
condition (3)-(5) guarantee that the flows into and out of each employment state are balanced so 
that the unemployment rate and the composition of the unemployment pool (i.e., the distribution 
of Ut over t) are time invariant.
The model consists of fifty-two equations (one each in (1) - (3), (5), (7), (8), (10) - (12), 
(14), and (15); ten each in (4) and (9); and eleven each in (6) and (13)), fifty-two unknowns (J, 
V,Ut,fort< 11, Un , mt fort< 11, mn , pt for t < 11, pn, A, Vt for t < 11, Vn , and Ve) and seven 
parameters (F, L, s, c, x, w, and r). Once the model has been solved, the unemployment rate 
(p) and the expected duration of unemployment (d) can be calculated using (16) and (17).
S tmt Ut «  rnUn S
r-i M2
Equation (16) states that the unemployment rate is equal to total unemployment divided by the size 
of the labor force. The duration of unemployment is calculated by following one cohort of newly 
unemployed workers and calculating the average number of periods it takes these workers to find 
employment.
B. The Solution Algorithm
To determine the impact of the bonus program we need to solve the model for b = 0 and 
500 and compare the unemployment rates and conditional reemployment probabilities. To 
accomplish this, we need estimate of the parameters for the model. Unfortunately, the cost 
parameter (c) and full employment (f) are not observable. We therefore proceed in two steps. 
First, we arbitrarily choose a labor force size of 100, and note that for values of F ranging from
99 to 101 the model predicts an equilibrium unemployment rate in the range 5% to 12%, which 
seems appropriate given the time period in which the experiment was conducted. We therefore 
carry out the analysis for ratios of F to L falling in the range of 0.99 to 1.01 and demonstrate that 
our results are robust with respect to this ratio (since the model is homogeneous for degree zero 
in F and L, there is no loss of generality involved in this procedure). Next, we obtain values for 
x, w, and d from data gathered to evaluate the experiment. We then choose appropriate ranges 
of values for r and s, relying on the literature for guidance. By treating d as a parameter, we are 
then able to add equation (17) to the model and solve for the endogenous variables treating c as 
endogenous. For each pair (s,r) this gives us as a values for c that is consistent with the data. 
We demonstrate below that our results hold for all values of r and s that seem reasonable.
In the Illinois bonus experiment, the average weekly wage earned by reemployed workers 
was $240. During the experiment, the average weekly unemployment insurance benefit equaled 
$137 (see Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987). The average spell of insured unemployment for 
controls during the experiment was 20.1 weeks. We therefore set w = 240, x= 137, and d = 20.1. 
In addition, we begin by setting b-0.
For values of s, the weekly separation rate, and r, the weekly discount rate, we turn to the 
literature. Research by Eherenbert [1980], Clark and Summers [1982], and Murphy and Topel 
[1987] suggest that s falls somewhere in the range of .003 to .007 (the mean appears to be about 
.005 with as a standard error of .002). We therefore focus on the case s = .003 or .007. For 
r we consider values from zero to .01. This translates into annual discount rates ranging from 
zero to 67% and therefore should include most relevant values. While the value for c is 
sometimes sensitive to the values chosen for r and s, as we show below, our overall results 
concerning displacement are remarkably robust.
2. Step Two. In step one we obtained as as a value for c for each vector (s,r). In step 
two, we use these values to estimate the impact of the bonus program. To do so, we continue to 
assume that w = 240 and x= 137 (the importance of the assumption that the wage is not affected 
by the bonus is discussed at length in Section 2 below). In addition, we set b = 500. We then 
choose values for s and r, and set c according to the step one computations. The mode can then 
be solved for all endogenous variables including the unemployment rate (p) and the expected 
duration of unemployment (d).
C. Results
1. Search Effort and Reemplovment Probabilities. The model's implications for search 
effort and the conditional reemployment probabilities can be described as follows (see Figures 2 
and 3 for details of the case where s=.005, r=.004, and F-100). Since the bonus payment 
increases the expected return to search during the first eleven weeks of unemployment, its 
immediate impact is to increase the search effort of covered workers (pt)). The size of the impact 
is related to the number of weeks the worker has been unemployed, with newly unemployed 
workers responding less than those about to lose bonus coverage (see Figure 2). This follows
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from the fact that newly unemployed workers responding less than those about to lose bonus 
coverage (see Figure 2). This follows from the fact that newly unemployed workers face as a 
longer time horizon over which to search and (possibly) collect the bonus. As the spell of 
unemployment grows longer, workers begin to worry about losing eligibility and respond by 
searching wit greater effort.
The effect on uncovered workers (weeks 12 and higher) is more subtle. The increase in 
search effort of covered workers reduces thee conditional reemployment probability faced by 
uncovered workers (mn , see equation 7). This follows from the fact that the increased search 
effort by covered workers increases the expected number of job applicants at each firm (that is, 
A, rises) making it harder for uncovered workers to secure employment (see equation 8). At the 
same time, however, that fall in the conditional reemployment probability (mn) widens the gap 
between expected lifetime income for employed and uncovered unemployed workers (that is, Ve - 
Vn increases). Intuitively, the reduction in the conditional reemployment probability makes the 
future for uncovered unemployed workers less appealing and increases the benefit (in terms of 
expected income) from employment. From (15) it appears that the overall impact on the search 
effort of uncovered workers (pj is ambiguous, since mn falls while Ve - Vn rises). However, our 
computed results indicate that the second effect (Ve - Vn rising) dominates for all relevant 
parameter values so that uncovered search intensity (pj increases when the bonus program 
begins. The increase in search effort by these workers is always less than the increase by covered 
workers (in Figure 2, the dashed line is only slightly above the solid line in weeks 12 and higher).
Increased search activity does not necessarily translate into higher employment 
probabilities. After all, all workers are induced to search harder by the bonus program. While 
this greater search effort will, in general, result in as a lower equilibrium unemployment rate, the 
rivalry for jobs may produce an environment in which some classes of workers are less likely to 
find as a job even though they are searching harder. Figure 3 shows how the bonus program 
affects the conditional reemployment probabilities in as a typical case. Covered workers are 
rewarded for their increased search effort by brighter reemployment prospects while uncovered 
workers (weeks 12 and higher) face as a somewhat bleaker future than they would in the absence 
of the bonus program.
2. Duration and the Level of Unemployment. The changes n the reemployment 
probabilities induced by the bonus program affect the following variables of interest: the duration 
of unemployment (d), the number of both covered and uncovered unemployed workers (U.and 
UJ, the overall unemployment rate (p), 9 and the composition of the pool of unemployed ( 2-). 
We consider each in turn, and consider in the next subsection the implications of these findings 
for job creation and displacement.
9 Because we have set the size of the labor force at 100, U can be interpreted both as the total number of 
unemployed workers, and as the unemployment rate.
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Our model predicts that overall - that is, including both covered and uncovered workers - 
expected unemployment duration should fall by between .41 and .89 weeks in response to the 
bonus program (see the rows labeled Ad in Table 1). This prediction, which results because 
unemployed workers increase their search effort under the bonus program, is consistent with the 
direction of the findings of the Illinois claimant experiment, although somewhat smaller in 
magnitude. 10 Note that the size of the duration reduction predicted by our model depends on the 
interest rate and the separation rate, the increases in either resulting in greater reduction in 
duration.
Although the bonus program reduces unemployment duration for uncovered workers (see 
the rows labeled Adn in Table 1). This result stems from the (slightly) decreased reemployment 
probability faced by uncovered workers, discussed above, note that as a worker who is not 
covered by the bonus program finds it more difficult to find employment even though she is 
searching slightly harder than she would in the absence of the bonus program. 11 The results 
shown in Table 1 suggest that the bonus program increases uncovered workers' unemployment 
durations by between .36 and .65 weeks. Overall duration (d) falls despite this increase for 
uncovered workers (dj because decreases for covered workers more than offset the increase for 
uncovered workers.
Regarding unemployment, the model predicts that the bonus program reduces the 
equilibrium number of both covered and uncovered unemployed workers (see the rows labeled 
AU and AUn in Table 1). These results occur because the increased search efforts of both 
covered and uncovered workers result in the creation of jobs (see below). The decreases in 
unemployment tare small in both proportional and absolute terms: for relevant values of r, s, and 
F, the decrease in total unemployment this about one-tent to one-third of one percent, and the 
decrease in uncovered unemployment ranges from less than one-tenth to about one-quarter of one 
percent. Note that these quantitative effects, although small, are insensitive to changes*in the 
parameters. Note also that, since U can be interpreted as the unemployment rate (since L= 100), 
the decreases in unemployment simply equal decreases in the unemployment rate. Finally, the 
fraction of the unemployment pool consisting of uncovered workers ( ) actually decreases 
slightly from 57.0 to 56.7 percent (this result is not shown in the table).
3. Job Creation and Displacement. The results to this point suggest that the number 
of both covered and uncovered unemployed workers falls (and the unemployment rate falls)
1(>The reductions in duration predicted by our model are larger (and hence closer to the experimental findings) 
than those predicted by Levine (1988), Meyer (1988), and Mortensen (1987). Elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 
1989), we have found that the reduction in insured unemployment among experimental (bonus-covered) workers who were 
not eligible to receive Federal supplemental Compensation (12 weeks for benefits in addition to the 26 weeks of regular 
benefits) was .54 weeks, over the full benefit year. This actual reductionis bracketed by the range of .41 to .69 predicted 
by our model.
1 Recall that as a worker is uncovered if she is ineligible for UI benefits, has been unemployed beyond the bonus 
qualification period, or decides not to use the bonus opportunity.
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because jobs are created under the bonus program as as a result of workers' increased search 
effort. The number of jobs created depends on the values of the parameters. A summary is 
provided in Table 2, which suggests that job creation is for the most part independent of the 
discount rate but varies directly with the separation rate. Intuitively, higher values of s imply 
faster job turnover and as a greater return to search. Therefore, the increase in search activity 
has as a bigger impact on the economy when jobs are not very enduring. In all cases, however, 
the number of jobs created by the program is rather small, ranging from 114 per 100,000 (the 
sum of 38 and 76, for r = 0, s=.003, F = 99) to 424 per 100,000 (forr=.01, s=.007, F=101). 
Note that uncovered workers actually gain more jobs than covered workers. This is due to the 
fact that the reemployment probability for covered workers rises as as a result of the program so 
that fewer workers fail to find as a job in the first eleven weeks of search. This result highlights 
the importance of the gross job creation effect.
From the point of view of policy, as a central concern is whether improvements 
experienced by covered workers come at the expense of uncovered workers - that is, whether the 
bonus program results in displacement of uncovered by covered workers. In the sense that the 
higher reemployment probabilities for covered workers lower the reemployment probabilities of 
uncovered workers, the underlying mechanism exists for such displacement. Indeed, as noted 
above, as a worker who becomes unemployed and is uncovered by the bonus program can expect 
as a longer spell of unemployment as as a result of the bonus program.
Nevertheless, unemployment of both covered and uncovered workers falls as a as a result 
of the bonus program (Table 1) , and jobs are created for both covered and uncovered workers 
(Table 2). It follows that, as as a result of the bonus program, any worker is more likely to be 
employed at as a given time, and is better off as as a result. Accordingly, we conclude that 
reductions in covered unemployment do not come at the expense of increased uncovered 
unemployment, and in this sense the bonus program entails no displacement effect. The result 
that the bonus program fails to generate displacement is remarkable robust. We obtain roughly 
the same quantitative results for all values of r and s used (see Table 1 , rows labeled AU and
4. Displacement and Rivalry. For two reasons, the increased search effort of covered 
workers which is generated by the bonus, fails to displace uncovered workers n our model. First, 
although increased search effort by covered workers reduces somewhat the reemployment 
probability of uncovered workers, it also improves the performance of the economy by creating 
new jobs (with increased search activity, the economy is able to produce more new jobs in each 
period). These new jobs will eventually break-up and produce vacancies that can be filled either 
with covered or uncovered workers. This naturally benefits all unemployed workers. Second, 
increased search effort by covered workers triggers an increase in search effort by uncovered 
workers. This rivalry effect also tends to neutralize the displacement effect.
Whether the rivalry effect is important can be appraised by solving he model with the 
bonus program in effect holding uncovered search effort fixed at its pre-bonus level. Tables 3
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and 4 are equivalent to Tables 1 and 2, but omit the rivalry effect. A comparison of these tables 
makes it clear that the rivalry effect is actually extremely small. The implication is that the job 
creation effect drives our result that there is no displacement effect of the bonus program.
II. Displacement with Endogenous Wages
The Illinois bonus experiment had virtually no impact on the earnings of workers who 
were covered by the bonus (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, Table 5). This provides at least 
one defense for our treatment of wages as exogenous in section I. Nevertheless, it seems 
important to verify that the empirical finding that wages are unaffected by the bonus program is 
consistent with as a matching model in which wages are endogenous. Accordingly, in this section 
we extend the model to allow for endogenous wage determination. The main finding of the 
section is that wages vary very little when they are treated as a endogenous. It follows that the 
results derived in section I are qualitatively unchanged when wages are allowed to vary.
A. The Model
The model is patterned after the one introduced in Section I with two minor exceptions. 
First, for simplicity we work in continuous rather than discrete time. Interims of interpreting the 
model, this makes little difference. It does, however, simplify the link between the contact and 
reemployment probabilities, making the model somewhat more manageable (in continuous time 
the probability that two applications for employment are filed at the same time is zero so that we 
need not worry about ties). The second change concerns the modeling of the bonus program. 
In Section I, the set of covered workers consisted of insured unemployed workers in the first 
eleven weeks of search. Any worker unemployed for more than eleven weeks was classified as 
uncovered. In this section, we assume that the worker collects the bonus whenever reemployment 
occurs. In other words, bonus coverage is not tied to length of search. Nevertheless, there will 
still be as a class of uncovered workers since some workers are ineligible for UI (and hence 
uncovered by the bonus program) and others may choose not to participate (this was actually as 
a non-trivial problem in the Illinois experiment, see Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987). Since 
covered workers discount the future, they will still respond to the program by increasing search 
effort (to collect the bonus sooner). Therefore the only real distinction between the two models 
is that there is no longer as a flow of workers from covered to uncovered status. As we will see 
below, this change has little impact on the results. However, this way of modeling the program 
greatly simplifies he task of making wages endogenous (for reasons discussed below).
1. Steady State conditions. One of the advantages of working in this simplified 
framework is that the number of employment states is reduced from thirteen to three - employed, 
unemployed and covered, and unemployed and uncovered. We let Uj denote the number of type 
i unemployed workers where i = c or n for covered and uncovered, respectively. Lc represents 
the number of workers in the labor force (employed and unemployed) who are covered by the
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bonus program, and Ln is the number of uncovered workers in the labor force. Finally, A denotes 
the proportion of steady state jobs held by uncovered workers.
The analogues of equations (1) and (2) are listed below.
(18) p m j + V
(19) . . u
(20) U
Equation (18) defines full employment and is identical to (1). Equation (19) simply states that, 
at each point in time, each uncovered worker is either employed or unemployed. Equation (20) 
makes the same statement for covered workers.
The steady state conditions are derived (as in Section I) by equating the flows into and out 
of each employment state. Let mi denote the reemployment probability for type i unemployed 
workers. Then, at each point in time, mcUc covered workers and mnUn uncovered workers find 
employment. The flow into unemployment depends on the break-up rate and the composition of 
the work force. Since s represents the separation rate and since A is the fraction of jobs held by 
uncovered workers, sA,J uncovered workers lose their jobs at each point in time, j By as a similar 
argument, s(l-A)J covered workers enter the unemployment pool each instant. Equating the flows 
into and out of each state yields the following steady-state conditions.
(21)
- mn Un
If (21) and (22) hold, the unemployment rate and the composition of unemployment 
(i.e.., _ L_ ) remain constant over time.
2. The Search Technology. Our assumptions concerning the search technology were 
discussed in Section I. The only adjustment that must now be made is due to the difference 
between the continuous and discrete time frameworks. In Section I we worked with discrete time 
and therefore needed to take into account the fact that more than one worker could apply for the 
same job at the same time. This possibility cannot arise in continuous time since the probability 
of two workers arriving at the same firm at exactly the same time is zero. This implies that the 
probability that as a typical worker finds reemployment its simply equal to the probability of
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contacting as a firm times the probability that the firm has as a vacancy. Letting pc and Pn denote 
the contact probabilities (which as before may be interpreted as search effort) , we have
(23) *.-P.j
(24) «. - P.
3. Wage Determination. When frictions are present in the labor market, workers and 
firms each possess some degree of monopoly power. After all, if they cannot reach agreement 
n the terms of employment, then they each must re-enter the search process in pursuit of as a new 
trading partner. Since search is costly and time-consuming they would prefer, if possible, to 
settle on as a contact and begin production. It seems reasonable to assume that the outcome of 
eh negotiation will reflect the tightness of the labor market. For example, when unemployment 
is high and vacancies are easy to fill, the firm will possess much bargaining power and should 
be able to force the worker to accept as a low wage. If, on the other hand, the economy is 
operating at close to full employment, the worker should be able to extract as a high wage from 
the firm.
To capture the notion that agents may have market power, we assume that wages are 
determined though as a bargaining process in which the firm and worker exchange wage offers 
until one side makes an offer the other side finds acceptable. The tightness of the labor market 
affects the relative bargaining positions of the agents and therefore has as a direct impact on the 
negotiated wage.
To solve the bargaining problem, we begin by describing the expected lifetime, income of 
each worker in the economy and the expected future profit of each firm. We use V l to denote 
the expected lifetime income for as a type i unemployed worker and V l represents the expected 
lifetime income for the employed counterpart (i = c and n). In addition, we use IIj to denote the 
expected future profit earned by as a firm employing as a type i worker and IIV to represent the 
expected future profit of as a firm with as a vacancy, finally, Wj denotes the wage earned by type 
i workers.
Consider first the position of an unemployed worker who is covered by the bonus 
program. In each small unit of time (At) the probability of finding employment is mc (At), in 
which case the worker changes status and can expect to earn V c in the future. In addition, the 
worker collects as a bonus payment equal to b. With probability [l-mc (At)] the worker remains 
unemployed and continues to expect to earn V c in the future. Finally, this worker collects x in 
unemployment compensation and incurs search costs of cp in each instant of time. Therefore,
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(25) c «e(A0 (v + b) * [1 - mc (AQ]V + fr - q (Afl 
=
Note that the right-hand side is discounted to reflect the fact that payment occurs in the future, 
the analogous condition for unemployed workers not covered by the program is
(26) «.(A0V * [1 - mn(Af)]v * [X -
1 * r(Ar)
Next we consider the position for type i employed workers. With probability s(At) the 
worker becomes unemployed and expects to earn V l in the future. With probability [1 - s(At)] 
the worker remains employed and continues to expect to earn V ' in the future. Finally, over this 
interval of time, the worker is paid Wj for each instant on the job. Therefore,
,(27) , J(AQV * [1 - j(AQ]l * w.(AQ i = c ,n.
1 * r(Afl
To find expected profit let c^ represent the probability of filling as a vacancy with as a type 
i worker at any point in time. That is, over as a small interval of time (At), the probability of 
filling as a vacancy with a type i worker is q^At) and the probability that the vacancy will remain 
unfilled is [1 - (qc + qn) (At)] . In the former case, the firm changes status and expects to earn IIj 
in the future. If the vacancy remains open, the firm continues to expect to earn IIV in the future. 
Therefore,
(28) n geWnc - g.WH. * [l - (ge *
1 * r(Af)
Once again, the right-hand side must be discounted to reflect the fact that these profits are 
collected in the future.
Now, consider the position of as a firm that has filled its vacancy with as a type i worker. 
With probability s(At) the job dissolves and the firm's expected future profit drops to IIV . With 
probability [l-s(At)] the job remains intact and the firm continues to expect to earn H in the 
future. Finally, over this short interval of time the firm earns P-WJ where P denotes marginal 
revenue product. Therefore,
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(29) n J(AQIIy + [1 - j(AQ]II, * (P - w,)(AQ i = c ,n.
1 * r(AO
Finally, since mi\]i type i workers find employment at each moment in time and since V 
denotes the total number of vacancies, it follows that
<30> ,, - !& i = c,n.
We are now in position to describe the solution t the bargaining problem. We assume that 
wages are determined by as a bargaining process in which the firm and the worker exchange wage 
offers until one sides makes an offer the other side finds acceptable. It is by now well known that 
the equilibrium of this game is equivalent to he Nash Cooperative Bargaining solution (see, for 
example, Rubinstein, 1982). This solution splits the surplus generated by the job evenly. For 
the worker, employment increases expected lifetime income from V l to V ' while for the firm, 
filling as a vacancy increases expected future profits form IIV to IIj. Therefore, since the surplus 
must be split evenly, Wj solves
(3D v£ - v£ - n, - n, for i = c ,n.
4. Search Intensity. A type i unemployed worker expects to earn V l in the future. 
Each worker chooses search effort (pj, which also represents the probability of contacting as a 
firm) to maximize this value. Solving (25) -(27) we obtain
(32) r fr - CPC
u r(r
(33) ^ _ I*-______ 
u r(r + s + m
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Maximizing (32) and (33) over pc and pn yields optimal search effort (the reader is reminded that 
nij is as a function of Pj through (23) and (24)). Applying Bellman's Principle of Optimaly and 
differentiating we obtain 12
(34) p m _ ic 2(r + j)2 _ C [X _ w b(r + sy\ . c (r +1?).
c c v
(35) p . I/C 2(r «. s)2 . c[x _ w] _ c(r + S)
In summary, the extended model consists of twenty equations (two each in (27), (29), (30) 
and (31), and (18)-(26), (28), (34), and (35)) in twenty unknowns (J, V, Uc , UN , A. mn , mc , pn , 
p c , V c , V n , V c , V n , wn , wc , Ily, IIC , nn , qn , and qc). There are nine parameters (F, Lc , Ln , 
s, c, x, b, P, and r). Once the model has been solved, the unemployment rate (\i) and the 
expected duration of unemployment for each class of workers (dj for type i workers) can be 
calculated using (36) and (37).
(36) ., . c * B
Lc + Ln
(37) d{ . J_ 
mf.
Equation (36) is self-explanatory. Equation (37) applies the well-known fact that the reciprocal 
of the reemployment probability equals the expected duration of unemployment in continuous time 
models.
B. The Solution Algorithm
We apply the same two-step procedure described in Section I to determine the impact of 
the bonus program. We allow F to vary between 99 and 101 and we use the same data discussed 
in Section I to infer values for c and P (the marginal revenue product of labor). The only 
difference is that L, the total labor force in Section I, is now divided into two sub-groups - 
covered and uncovered workers. Since slightly over one-third of all unemployed workers in 
Illinois during the bonus experiment were eligible for UI, we set Lc = 35 and Ln = 65. As 
before, since our estimates for s and r are taken from other sources, the analysis is carried out
12In maximizing expected lifetime income over p we treat Wj as as a parameter. The rationale for this is that 
since each worker is small relative to the market, each individual can ignore his/her own effecton the wage. This is 
similar to our assumption concerning A in the discrete time model (see footnote 8).
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for as a variety of combinations of these values. Our results are not very sensitive to small 
changes in these parameters.
Once we have estimates for F, c, and P, we allow b to vary and trace out the effect on 
employment and the duration of unemployment.
C. Results
As n Section I, the immediate impact of the bonus program is to increase the search effort 
of covered workers. This triggers and increase in the search effort of uncovered workers and 
generates an increase in the level of steady state employment. With the economy operating closer 
to full employment, the bargaining positions of both firms and workers are strengthened so that 
the overall impact on wages is ambiguous. For the values of the parameters that we have chosen, 
we find that the bonus program always increases wages by as a small amount (less than one-half 
of one percent) with wages earned by covered workers rising (roughly) twice as much as those 
earned by uncovered workers. The small magnitude of these changes is consistent with the 
results reported by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), who found no statistically significant 
change in wages resulting from the Illinois bonus.
With such as a small change in wages, we would not expect the results in this section to 
differ much from those obtained in Section I. They do not, as the results in Table 5 show. 
Covered unemployment duration (dc) falls by between 0.34 and 1.29 weeks, with as a decrease 
of about 0.75 weeks for s = .005 and r = .004. In general, these impacts are somewhat larger 
than those found above in the model with fixed wages. For workers not covered by the bonus 
program, unemployment duration (dj actually falls slightly in some cases (those with low interest 
and separation rates), although it increases somewhat in most of the cases we examine. For s = 
.005 and r = .004, for example, dn increases by about .06 weeks. But even in the cases where 
dn increases, the increase is less in this model than in the fixed-wage model.
Regarding unemployment (U), the bonus program lowers both the overall level and rate 
of unemployment, although the decrease is smaller here than in the model with fixed wages (the 
range is between .04 and .16 percentage point). Unemployment of uncovered workers (Un) 
actually falls in most cases in this model, although the decreases are small; again for s - .005, r 
= .004, and f = 100, the decrease is .016 percentage point.
The impact of the program on job creation is summarized in Table 6. As in Section I, the 
program increases the steady-state number of jobs. However, unlike the fixed-wage case, there 
are some instances in which the number of jobs held by uncovered workers falls (including s = 
.005 and r - .004). Yet, even in such cases the displacement effect is quite small.
When the rivalry effect is removed, the qualitative nature of our results remains the same. 
This is demonstrated in Tables 7 and 8 which are equivalent to Tables 5 and 6 except that they 
are generated by holding the search effort of uncovered workers fixed at its pre-bonus program
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level. A comparison across tables reveals that, as in Section I, the rivalry effect is small and the 
job creation effect tends to dominate and drive the results.
III. Conclusion
Three groups of workers would not be covered by as a bonus reemployment program: 
Workers ineligible for UI, workers who fail to find as a job within the bonus qualification period, 
and workers who, for some reason, simply don't participate (in the sense of trying to obtain as 
a bonus). Our results strongly suggest that none of these groups of workers is likely to be made 
significantly worse off by as a reemployment bonus program. As the results shown in Tables 2, 
4,6, and 8 illustrate, the displacement effect of uncovered by covered workers is nonexistent of 
very small in magnitude. In other words, the jobs gained by workers who make use of the 
reemployment bonus do not appear to come at the expense of workers who are not covered by 
the program.
This is not to say that the underlying mechanism for displacement of uncovered by covered 
workers does not exist in our model - it does. The bonus program decreases the reemployment 
probability of uncovered workers, and as as a result, uncovered workers face as a longer expected 
duration of unemployment. But the bonus program also has as a job-creation effect. Because the 
bonus program increases workers' search effort, jobs come into existence that would not have 
existed in the absence of the program. Our results suggest that both covered and uncovered 
workers benefit, in the sense that there will be fewer unemployed workers - both covered and 
uncovered - under the bonus program. Because the model predicts that the probability of 
unemployment for both covered and uncovered workers is lower under the bonus program, we 
conclude that the bonus program entails no displacement effect. In effect, the bonus program 
induces job creation as the labor market makes better use of its search technology. With the 
economy producing closer to capacity, both covered and uncovered workers benefit.
Finally, it is worth noting that our model could be used to investigate the displacement 
effect of as a variety of government policies, such as training programs intensive job-search 
assistance, and targeted job tax credits. While the model is relatively simple in structure (in that 
workers and firms are both homogeneous), it is rich enough to capture many important labor 
market features (job turnover, search behavior, and so on). Moreover, it is an equilibrium model 
in the sense that we model both sides of the labor market. This allows one to determine both the 
direct and indirect effects (through, for example, unemployment) of as a government program.
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Table 1
Bonus -Induced Changes in Unemployment Duration and Unemployment, 
Job Matching Model with Rivalry Effect
s - 0.006 _____s - 0.010_____ ______s - 0.014 
T-96.25 T=97.5 T 95 T 96.25 T-97.5 T=95 T=96.25 ;
Ad
Adi
AU
AUj
AUn
Z (for r=.002)
Z (for r-.008)
Z (for r-.020)
-.714
.414
-.010
.071
.015
1.087
1.149
1.269
-.714
.286
-.031
.050
-.008
1.122
1.204
1.357
-.714
.331
-.038
.093
.000
1.164
1.238
1.378
-.714
.269
-.053
.077
-.018
1.196
1.280
1.447
-.714
.225
-.065
.065
-.031
1.226
1.319
1.489
-.714
.262
-.073
.102
-.027
1.270
1.352
1.510
-.714
.228
-.084
.090
-.040
1.297
1.387
1.553
-.714
.202
-.093
.081
-.050
1.323
1.418
1.593
Notes: s - bi-weekly separation rate; T - total available jobs; Ad - change in expected 
duration of unemployment for UI-eligible workers (in weeks); Ad  - change in expected 
duration for UI-ineligible workers (in weeks); AU =  change in total number of unemployed 
workers (= change in unemployment rate); AUi - change in number of UI-ineligible 
unemployed workers; AUn «- change in number of unemployed workers not offered the bonus; z 
  parameter in the search-cost function; r   bi-weekly interest rate.
Estimates of Ad, Adif AU, AUj, and AUn are nearly invariant to changes in r; figures 
shown are for r - .008. Computed values of z vary with respect to r as shown.
In the absence of the bonus, unemployment (U) equals 4.6 when s - 0.006, 7.43 when s 
= 0.01, and 10.1 when s = 0.014. Also in the absence of the bonus, d is set to 22.7 weeks 
and d to 12.3 weeks. . .
Table 2
Employment Changes for UI-eligible and UI-ineligible Workers, 
Model with Rivalry Effect
Employment 
Change 
(per 100,000 
in labor
force) 
for: s - 0.006 s - 0.010
T-96.25 T-97.5 T-95 1=^6^25 T-97.5
Ul-eligible 213 212 353 351 349 
workers
Ul-ineligible -124 -87 -168 -138 -116 
workers
s - 0.014
T-95 T-96.25 T-97.5
488 485 484
-190 -168 -150
Notes; s - bi-weekly separation rate; T - total available jobs. Estimates are nearly 
invariant to changes in the bi-weekly interest rate (r); figures shown are for r - .008.
Table 3
Bonus-Induced Changes in Unemployment Duration and Unemployment, 
Job Matching Model without the Rivalry Effect
s - 0.006 _____s - 0.010______ ______s =- 0.014 
T=96.25 T 97.5 T»95 T~96.25 T-97.5 T=95 T 96.25
Ad
Adi
AU
AUi
AUn
-.655
.356
-.013
.061
.010
-.697
.243
-.036
.043
-.015
-.676
.279
-.044
.079
-.009
-.689
.226
-.060
.065
-.025
-.693
.188
-.070
.055
-.038
-.682
.218
-.080
.086
-.036
-.684
.190
-.091
.076
-.047
-.685
.168
-.098
.068
-.056
Notes: s « bi-weekly separation rate; T   total available jobs; Ad   change in expected 
duration of unemployment for Ul-eligible workers (in weeks); Adi - change in expected 
duration for UI-ineligible workers (in weeks); AU - change in total number of unemployed 
workers (-» change in unemployment rate); A^ - change in number of UI-ineligible 
unemployed workers; AUn   change in number of unemployed workers not offered the bonus.
Estimates of Ad , Adif AU , AUiF and AUn are nearly invariant to changes in the bi 
weekly interest rate (z); figures shown are for r » .008.
In the absence of the bonus, unemployment (U) equals 4.6 when s   0.006, 7.43 when s 
=* 0.01, and 10.1 when s = 0.014. Also in the absence of the bonus, d is set to 22.7 weeks 
and di to 12. 3 weeks.
Table 4
Employment Changes for Ul-eligible and Ul-ineligible Workers, 
Model without the Rivalry Effect
Employment 
Change 
(per 100,000 
in labor
force) 
for: s - 0.006 s - 0.010
T-96.25 T-97.5 T«95 T-96.25 T-97.5
Ul-eligible 196 207 332 337 338 
workers
UI- ineligible -107 -74 -142 -117 -99 
workers
s - 0.014
T-95 T-96.25 T-97.5
463 464 463
-160 -141 -127
Notes: s - bi-weekly separation rate; T - total available jobs. Estimates are nearly 
invariant to changes in the bi-weekly rate (r); figures shown are for r - .008.
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